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Abstract. This article describes impediments to multilateral inspections that are sanctioned by a
multilateral political entity to proscribe the development, production, storage, deployment, and
employment of weapons of mass destruction.
You are an aspiring inspector on a multilateral team sanctioned by a multilateral political entity. The
purpose of the team is to proscribe the development, production, deployment, and employment of
weapons of mass destruction. The host country of the inspection may not be a willing participant. Based
on the seven-year experience of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), you may run into a
few problems.
Motivational impediments of team members. Some members of your team will be most interested in
their financial remuneration. They will not want to endanger access to this remuneration. Given that
energetic and proactive inspecting may well lead to complaints by the host country including demands
that "offenders" be removed from your team, members with a significant financial motivation may be
more likely to sin through omission instead of commission--doing too little as opposed to pushing the
envelope of inspecting expertise. (This "doing too little" also seems to be the adaptive bias of many
survivors of careers in organizations.) On the other hand, those who are forced to give up some or all of
their remuneration to their sponsoring countries may be more susceptible to financial and other
inducements to act in a manner consonant with the needs of the host country as opposed to the
sanctioning multilateral entity.
Some members of your team may be intelligence assets--most likely collectors or agents of influence-controlled by the host country or by their sponsoring countries. They may even be assets of the
multilateral entity that may at least partially have an agenda divergent from the public purpose of your
inspection team. Such members may intentionally act at cross-purposes to your team.
Some members may have personality and professional agendas that induce behavior contrary to the
purpose of your team. Personality agendas may include the needs to provoke confrontation, to find
duplicity regardless of its significance or validity, to conform or not to conform with procedures, or to
create or not to create enemy images. Professional agendas may include then needs to maintain prior
positions or to seek more prestigious or desired ones. Other personal and professional Issues include
concerns about meeting one's preferred life style and challenging styles of stress management that can
significantly affect inspection abilities and motivation. And, of course, there are the common problems
of personality chemistries, envies, jealousies, cross-cultural communication inadequacies, and the like.
Motivational impediments of sponsoring countries and of the sanctioning multilateral entity.
Motivations may change over the course of time. Political stances that seemed appropriate through a
strategic-moral calculus may seem quite different in the light of events sometime after the initial
commitment to mandate and support inspection. In other words, sponsors and sanctioners may decide
to work contrary to the purpose of your inspection team--sometimes unbeknownst to that team. The
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same may occur through a phenomenon that seems to be captured by the psychological construct of
habituation.
Motivational impediments of the host country. The host country may be an unwilling participant
because what you intend to proscribe it desires to prescribe. Even if this were not the case, the host
country may view its senses of sovereignty, nationalism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, tradition, and selfefficacy as being violated. The consequential probability of deception is high. The consequential effect of
deception may only be limited by the host's deceptive and the team's counterdeceptive abilities.
This brief motivational analysis suggests that a multilateral inspection's form and substance barely
masks a plethora of competing dynamics. Your stint on the team may well be unsuccessful as to its
stated purpose but a complete success as to entering through a looking glass into a wonderland of
deceit from friends and enemies alike. (See Boyer, P.J. (November 9, 1998). Scott Ritter's private war.
The New Yorker, pp. 56-73; Crossette, B. (November 6, 1998). U.N., avoiding talk of force, criticizes Iraq
on arms team. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Knapp, B.L. (1997). Beckett's That Time:
Exile and "that double-headed monster…time." Journal of Melanie Klein and Object Relations, 15, 493511; Walton, M.D. (1998). Ostensible lies and the negotiation of shared meanings. Discourse Processes,
26, 27-41.) (Keywords: Deception, Inspection, Motivation: The International Religious Freedom Act of
1998 as an Act Against Freedom, the Truth, and Religious Freedom.)
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